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ABSTRACT: The current fee-for-service system of paying for health care emphasizes 
volume and complexity, and often discourages attempts to improve effectiveness and 
efficiency. This brief discusses several policies that could begin to move away from the 
adverse incentives embedded in the current system to incentives that encourage better 
care and better value. The authors believe that U.S. health care would be better and more 
efficient if the system as a whole functioned the way top-performing providers do, with 
greater accountability for specific populations and for the totality of care delivered. They 
argue that the Medicare program is an ideal starting point for delivery system reform.
                    
OveRview
Most of the debate over health reform has focused on the process by which 
insurance coverage will be expanded to the uninsured, the cost of doing so, and 
the role of the federal government. While these issues are crucial to how health 
reform unfolds, the long term success of any policies enacted this year—and, 
indeed, the long-term viability of the U.S. health system itself—will be deter-
mined in large part by the nation’s ability to change the way health care is orga-
nized and delivered. Without a shift in emphasis from more services to more 
effective care, and from more complex procedures to more appropriate treatment, 
any reform that extends coverage will place greater burden on a system that is 
already on an unsustainable path.
Achieving needed change in health care delivery requires change, as well, 
in the way we pay for care. The current fee-for-service system emphasizes vol-
ume and complexity, and often discourages attempts to improve effectiveness 
and efficiency. This paper discusses several policies that could begin to move 
away from the adverse incentives embedded in the current payment system to 
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payment reform alone. Changes in payment and orga-
nizational structure need to be pursued together, so that 
payment incentives encourage integration and account-
ability at the same time the delivery system becomes 
able to respond to those incentives. The Medicare 
program, as the country’s largest payer for health care 
services, has the potential to lead such changes and is 
the logical choice to play that role.
We observe a continuum of delivery system 
organization, from small physician practices and unre-
lated hospitals to fully integrated delivery systems 
(Exhibit 1). In between these extremes are primary and 
specialty care physician groups, multispecialty group 
practices, and hospital systems. A reformed delivery 
system is one in which providers are able and willing 
to take collective responsibility for their patients, the 
care they provide, and the resources used in the pro-
cess. This type of care is more typical of organizations 
that lie on the more integrated side of the continuum 
than on the less integrated side. However, we do not 
advocate a single organizational model. Rather, the 
delivery system we envision would be characterized by 
different types of provider organizations, all with the 
common feature that they are clinically and financially 
accountable for their patients and the care they provide.
For the purpose of this discussion, we designate 
such organizations “accountable care organizations” 
(ACOs). We use this term not in reference to any spe-
cific ACO model currently being proposed, but in the 
sense of Shortell and Casalino’s “accountable care sys-
tem,” which they define as “an entity that can imple-
ment organized processes for improving the quality and 
controlling the costs of care and be held accountable 
for the results.”2 Shortell and Casalino also describe 
a number of organizational forms that might fit this 
definition, some of which have been termed “ACOs” 
in the current health reform debate. These include the 
extended hospital–medical staff, the physician–hospital 
organization, the interdependent practice organization 
(similar to an independent practice association, but 
with stronger governance and leadership and a culture 
of performance improvement) and the health plan–pro-
vider organization. We would add to this list the fully 
incentives that encourage better care and better value. 
The discussion is largely from the perspective of  
multispecialty group practices, which exhibit many 
of the traits that are thought to be desirable system-
wide, but the principles upon which it is based could 
be applied to a variety of organizational models. And 
while the focus is on Medicare’s role in developing and 
implementing payment system reforms, all of these 
policies would be most effective in the context of  
multipayer initiatives.
BACkgROunD
There is widespread agreement that expanded access to 
care cannot be sustained without containing costs. This 
is not a new insight; indeed, the challenge of cost con-
tainment has bedeviled attempts at health reform for 
the past 50 years. What’s new this time around is poli-
cymakers’ increasing recognition of the link between 
cost containment and the organization (or lack thereof) 
of health care delivery. Analyses of geographic varia-
tions in cost and quality provide policymakers with 
an idea of how care could be delivered effectively and 
efficiently, based on the top-performing areas.1 And in 
many cases, the favorable results in those top-perform-
ing areas are driven by large, multispecialty medical 
groups and the larger health systems with which they 
are affiliated.
With health reform high on the policy agenda, 
the time is ripe for concrete proposals to achieve major 
changes in care delivery to foster improved quality and 
efficiency. A key element in accomplishing this goal 
will be reforming the way providers are paid. The cur-
rent fee-for-service system encourages greater volume 
and intensity of services, rather than higher value—
and there generally is no accountability for health care 
quality, outcomes, or cost. Until we move away from 
this type of payment, we will continue providing inap-
propriate incentives and will continue to hinder  
progress toward more effective and efficient health 
care delivery. 
However, with most providers across the coun-
try configured in small, independent units, it may 
be difficult to change health care delivery through 
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integrated delivery system. Our use of the term “ACO” 
encompasses all of these forms, as well as others that 
are doubtless yet to be proposed.
To better understand how Medicare payment 
reform could make accountable care organizations 
more widespread, it is useful to draw on the expertise 
of the country’s existing multispecialty group prac-
tices. These groups are arguably already in the best 
position to respond to the payment incentives that we 
hope to see under a reformed health system. To that 
end, the Council of Accountable Physician Practices, 
The Commonwealth Fund, and the Kaiser Permanente 
Institute for Health Policy brought together several 
dozen leaders of multispecialty group practices and 
other health policy experts to engage in a discussion 
about specific actions Congress could take to imple-
ment delivery system reform in Medicare. This brief is 
informed by that discussion, although it should not be 
taken as specifically representing the opinion of any 
attendee at that meeting.
DeSign iSSueS fOR MeDiCARe DeLiveRy 
SySTeM RefORM
The ideal Medicare program would pay accountable 
care organizations for a set of services or a defined 
period (rather than paying service by service) for a 
defined population. To reach this point, several impor-
tant design issues would need to be considered:
An array of approaches to Medicare delivery 1. 
system reform may be necessary to correspond 
to the wide range of characteristics of local 
systems, which will be more or less able to 
adopt any single approach.
Medicare payments to provider organizations 2. 
in a new program should be designed to share 
savings relative to a benchmark estimate of 
expected costs, as well as the attainment and 
maintenance of a high quality of care and 
improved outcomes (i.e., the use of a “carrot”).
The need to abandon the adverse incentives 3. 
embedded in the current system must be 
emphasized by the expectation of deteriorat-
ing fee-for-service payments in Medicare over 
time (i.e., the use of a “stick”).
The strength of new incentives can be 4. 
increased by encouraging “all-payer” 
approaches, in which Medicare and one or 
more commercial carriers use the same pay-
ment structure—recognizing that the inclusion 
of other payers may complicate the process.
A number of additional design issues warrant 
further discussion.
voluntary vs. Mandatory Participation
Should Medicare’s organizational and payment 
changes be voluntary for both providers and patients? 
What should the ramifications be for providers and 
patients who choose not to participate in the new care 
organizations and accompanying payment systems?
For providers, a voluntary program would mean 
they could participate in Medicare as they do now. A 
mandatory program would mean there is no way to 
participate in Medicare other than as a member of an 
accountable care organization receiving the new pay-
ment method. For patients, a voluntary program would 
mean they could choose to affirmatively join an ACO 
(there could be incentives for making such a choice), 
but they would not be required to do so and could 
continue to receive care as they do now.3 Mandatory 
Exhibit 1. Continuum of Delivery System
 Organization in the United States
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models are felt to be politically infeasible, while volun-
tary models raise many technical issues and dilute the 
strength of incentives for improvement.
Attribution to Organizations
How should patients be “attributed” to accountable 
care organizations under a new payment system? That 
is, how would Medicare decide which patients should 
be assigned to each organization for purposes of paying 
those organizations accurately and gauging their per-
formance? Attribution raises both policy and technical 
questions; how it is done depends largely on whether 
participation in the program is mandatory for patients.
If patients are not required to actively choose 
an ACO, it would be necessary to use “virtual” attri-
bution to determine to which organization those 
patients belong. In a virtual-attribution model, patients 
would be attributed after the fact to the organiza-
tion where they received most of their care during a 
specific period. There are many technical issues that 
would need to be solved under this scenario, but, as 
Fisher and colleagues suggest, it can be done.4 These 
researchers found that many fee-for-service Medicare 
beneficiaries opt to receive 75 percent or more of 
their care in a given year from a single primary care 
provider and the hospital, or hospitals, in which that 
provider most often practices. Using quality and cost 
data, Medicare could reward these “virtual networks” 
deemed accountable for such beneficiaries for superior 
performance, irrespective of where the care was actu-
ally delivered.
Skeptics of the virtual-attribution model con-
tend that retrospective assignment of responsibility for 
specific patients makes it difficult to take responsibil-
ity for their care. Furthermore, even patients who are 
attributed to a virtual network of providers may obtain 
a significant portion of their care elsewhere—so that 
providers might be held accountable for services they 
neither deliver nor manage.
Attribution is much simpler under an “enroll-
ment” model, in which beneficiaries are required to 
actively choose an accountable care organization from 
which they will receive their care for a given period. 
As further incentive for choosing an ACO, beneficia-
ries could be offered benefit enhancements, such as a 
reduction in premiums or other out-of-pocket costs. 
This is hardly a novel idea: for several decades, ben-
eficiaries have been making such choices to join group 
and staff-model HMOs in the Medicare Advantage pro-
gram and its predecessors. 
Regardless of whether patient participation is 
mandatory and attribution is enrollment-based or vir-
tual, it is also important to determine whether patients 
should be attributed to individual physicians or to sys-
tems, and how broadly those systems could be defined.
Role of fee-for-Service Payment
Should the new payment system build on fee-for-ser-
vice (FFS) or scrap it entirely? Most Medicare payment 
reform proposals advocate one of the following three 
methodologies (or a combination thereof):
FFS payment with bonuses, under which, in •	
addition to the normal payment for services 
performed (either in full or with a portion of the 
amount withheld), rewards are given for high 
performance on quality, outcomes, or efficiency;
episode-based payment, or “bundling,” which •	
begins to move away from FFS payment by 
paying for a specified set of services provided 
during a given period, usually related to a cate-
gory of care (e.g., primary care), the occurrence 
of an initial health-related event (e.g., a hospital 
admission), or the presence of a chronic condi-
tion (e.g., congestive heart failure); and
global comprehensive care payment, or “capita-•	
tion,” which would eliminate FFS payment and 
replace it with a fixed payment for all health 
care provided to each patient for a fixed period, 
such as a year.
Rewards for high performance could be com-
bined with any of the approaches mentioned here. The 
addition of rewards to FFS payment has the advantage 
and disadvantage of bearing the closest resemblance 
to the currently predominant payment approach. The 
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objective of this payment methodology is to counter 
the adverse incentives of FFS with an explicit mes-
sage—supported by financial impact—that quality, 
good outcomes, and efficiency are desired by patients 
and payers, and that value, rather than volume and 
intensity, should be the focus. Pay-for-performance 
(for quality and outcomes) and shared savings (for effi-
ciency) are two versions of this approach. Rewards for 
efficiency through shared savings can be tied to per-
formance on quality and outcomes, as in the Medicare 
Physician Group Practice (PGP) Demonstration. 
Critics of this approach argue that the ability to mea-
sure quality is still too crude to ensure that rewards are 
targeted appropriately. Some stakeholders believe that 
the amount of payment devoted to these rewards in the 
United States tends to be too small to effectively coun-
ter the powerful adverse incentives of FFS payment.
Bundling mitigates one of the most the most 
troubling aspects of FFS by eliminating additional 
payment for each individual service provided to the 
patient. For the specified bundle—whether defined by 
a category of care, an initial event, or a condition—the 
incentive to providers is to produce the bundle in the 
most efficient way possible, because, all things equal, 
the use of additional resources means a reduction in 
net income. Advocates of bundling argue that it is an 
interim step between FFS payment and capitation, 
because it requires providers to work together to man-
age a patient, event, or condition efficiently, and such 
cooperation sets the stage for the further integration 
necessary to accept capitation. Critics of bundling point 
out that developing clear and generally acceptable defi-
nitions of bundles can be complicated, that it is diffi-
cult to allocate the bundled payment across the provid-
ers responsible for the bundle, and that there are strong 
incentives both to stint on care and to “unbundle” 
services—that is, to change practice so that services 
normally thought to be part of a bundle are considered 
separately and therefore generate additional payment.
Some experts believe that bundling based on 
conditions leads away from the kind of multispe-
cialty integration that is necessary for providers to 
accept capitation. Instead, this kind of bundling may 
encourage the formation of disease-specific provider 
organizations (sometimes called “focused factories”), 
which might include many types and levels of care, 
all focused on a given condition. Such an organization 
would not be able to accept capitation for the full spec-
trum of patients’ care. At issue is a question about the 
goal of payment reform. If the goal is, as we believe, to 
encourage greater integration of the delivery system for 
improved quality and efficiency, it will be important 
ultimately to move away from FFS payment altogether 
and toward capitation. As an interim measure, bundling 
based on events could be an important tool to encour-
age collaboration among providers. However, bundling 
based on conditions may further entrench the silos that 
have been created under the current FFS system.
We do note that full, global capitation—or full 
transfer of risk from payer to provider for all health 
care services—will not be feasible, or even desirable, 
for all provider organizations. It is useful to consider a 
range of capitation approaches with different degrees 
of risk-sharing between payer and provider, depending 
on the provider’s capabilities. There is a continuum of 
services for which a provider organization could accept 
risk. At the most basic level, a provider organization 
could accept risk only for professional, primary care 
services. Moving up the continuum, an organization 
could accept risk for any or all of the following: spe-
cialty care services, diagnostic tests, inpatient care, 
pharmacy, occupational medicine, and long-term care. 
More sophisticated delivery systems can accept risk 
(or capitation) for more of these services, and as an 
organization becomes more integrated it could take on 
additional risk.
Furthermore, there are varying degrees of risk 
that could be shared for each of these services. Kaiser 
Permanente is an example of a sophisticated, integrated 
organization where financial risk is shared between the 
payer, Kaiser Foundation Health Plan, and the physi-
cians, the Permanente Medical Groups. Risk assump-
tion by the medical groups is broad in scope (including 
physician services, hospital services, and pharmaceu-
ticals) but limited in scale to a modest portion of the 
annual physician income pool.
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Relationship Between Physicians  
and Hospitals
How should the relationship between physicians and 
hospitals be accounted for in a new payment system? 
Some stakeholders believe that hospitals do not need 
to be included with physicians in the same organiza-
tional framework. Underlying this view is the notion 
that with any new payment system aimed at improving 
quality and efficiency, hospitals will, of necessity, suf-
fer a reduction in admissions and a loss of revenue, and 
it is unreasonable to expect them to actively participate 
in such a program. In some areas where hospitals have 
monopoly (price-setting) power, it might be preferable 
to hold physicians accountable for the rate of hospital 
use only, rather than hospital costs, because costs are 
less likely to be under their control.5
Other stakeholders believe there can be no 
improvement in quality and efficiency without hospi-
tals involved, particularly around the difficult issues of 
transitions in care from the hospital to the community. 
One reason for including both hospitals and physicians 
in accountable care organizations is to align incentives 
between the two parties. Another reason is that with 
both hospitals and physicians covered under the same 
payment, the amount of funding available to create 
incentives for desired behavior is greater than if only 
physician funding were included.
There may be a need for interim measures to 
ease physicians and hospitals into structures in which 
they could receive a joint payment. For example, dur-
ing a transition period, physicians and hospitals could 
each receive separate payments designed to allow 
physicians to build their capability to reduce hospital 
utilization, and to allow hospitals to restructure them-
selves to adapt to lower utilization. A second approach 
to partially protect hospitals from financial loss as part 
of an ACO would be to increase payments for specific 
diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) and allow hospitals to 
share any savings that are achieved.
THe view fROM MuLTiSPeCiALTy  
gROuP PRACTiCeS
When we brought together the leaders of multispe-
cialty group practices and other health care experts at 
the June 5 roundtable, we asked them to consider the 
above design issues. We found that there were some 
areas of general agreement (but not necessarily consen-
sus), and other, more controversial areas where agree-
ment was more elusive. Areas of general agreement 
were as follows:
There is an urgent need for a Medicare •	
demonstration or waiver program to encourage 
delivery system reform.
Medicare’s Physician Group Practice •	
Demonstration can serve as a model for future 
initiatives, but several improvements could be 
made. The significant lag between delivery of 
care and access to performance information 
from Medicare is one problem. Another is the 
imposition of a threshold of 2 percent savings 
before participating groups could receive a per-
formance reward, which made it difficult for 
several of the groups early on to recoup the ini-
tial investments they made in improvement.6
Any new payment system should shrink •	
unwarranted geographic variation in Medicare 
FFS rates.
It may be necessary to allow different geo-•	
graphic areas (regions, states, or smaller areas) 
to implement new payment incentives in differ-
ent ways. It would also be helpful if Medicare 
could participate in state-level and all-payer 
efforts to improve quality and efficiency through 
payment reform.
Financial incentives will go a long way toward •	
encouraging providers to improve quality and 
efficiency. However, in many cases, simply 
removing financial disincentives for innovative 
care delivery methods will be sufficient. 
Furthermore, sharing performance data can be 
an important motivational tool for providers, 
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who often are naturally driven by professional 
pride and responsibility to provide high- 
quality care.
Finally, it is critically important to increase the •	
number of primary care physicians to sustain 
any accountable care organization.7 Primary 
care needs to be more attractive to new physi-
cians in terms of pay, training, and support to 
assume care management roles.
PROPOSALS fOR MeDiCARe-LeD DeLiveRy 
SySTeM RefORM
We believe that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid 
Services (CMS) may currently be ill-equipped to lead 
the redesign of delivery system structures and pay-
ment models. This is due partly to the limited nature 
of its demonstration authority, partly to hurdles pre-
sented by the process of identifying, approving, and 
implementing demonstrations, and partly to limited 
CMS resources available for the task.8 To address 
this problem, Congress could establish an Office of 
Payment and Delivery System Improvement within the 
Department of Health and Human Services (or CMS). 
This idea is not to detract from CMS’s authority, but 
rather to focus resources on an area requiring intense 
attention. The purpose of this office would be to rec-
ommend to Congress over the next few years a series 
of CMS fast-track waiver authorities regarding the 
formation and payment of integrated, accountable care 
organizations (again, not referring not to any specific 
model) and similar approaches. (Note: As this brief 
went to press, both houses of Congress, as part of com-
prehensive health care reform bills, were about to con-
sider the creation of a very similar entity, to be called 
the “CMS Innovation Center.”) Following are some 
ideas for waivers that could be implemented either 
alone or in combination with others.
Per Capita Prepayment or Retrospective 
Bonuses for Accountable Care Organizations
Congress could allow CMS to prepay accountable care 
organizations a global per capita amount (including 
Parts A, B, and D) for members who proactively enroll 
to receive their care from an ACO. Alternately, or in 
conjunction with this payment option, Congress could 
give certain ACOs that do not use fee-for-service pay-
ments the opportunity to receive a bonus for the care of 
beneficiaries attributed to the ACO, based on retrospec-
tive usage patterns. It is not clear whether prospective 
payment is necessary to change delivery system behav-
ior, or whether retrospective rewards create sufficient 
incentives for change.
The question of prospective versus retrospec-
tive payment is closely related to the attribution issues 
discussed previously in this brief. As noted, there are 
different views about the best way to attribute benefi-
ciaries to an ACO. Such attribution is necessary if the 
ACO is to be accountable for the cost and quality of 
care it delivers: it must know for whom it is responsi-
ble for providing care. Prepayment methodologies will 
work better with active or enrollment-based attribution 
models, in which beneficiaries choose a specific deliv-
ery organization and agree to receive their care there 
for a specified period. Retrospective bonus payment 
methodologies are more compatible with a virtual-
attribution model, in which beneficiaries are assigned 
to an ACO—for purposes of payment only—based on 
retrospective care patterns.
CMS may wish to test both prospective and 
retrospective payment methodologies, along with both 
enrollment-based and virtual-attribution models, to 
determine which works most effectively. There may 
turn out to be geographic differences in the fit of one 
model or the other. It is also possible for CMS to pay 
accountable care organizations simultaneously, using 
both payment models, if both turn out to be effective at 
improving quality and reducing costs.
Beneficiary incentives to Choose 
Accountable Care Organizations
CMS could allow ACOs using an enrollment-based 
model to encourage such enrollment through improved 
benefit incentives for beneficiaries. Some beneficiaries 
may be reluctant to enroll in an ACO, even a known 
and trusted one, because of the perceived loss of choice 
of provider—a popular characteristic of the current 
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traditional fee-for-service Medicare program. On the 
other hand, as noted recently by the Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission (MedPAC), an ACO model with 
enrolled beneficiaries is likely to have greater control 
of the care delivered, accept and succeed with stronger 
financial incentives, and potentially produce greater 
savings for Medicare than would the virtual-attribution 
ACO.9 Therefore, sufficient savings could likely be 
demonstrated from the enrollment model to allow for 
modestly improved benefits, or discounts on premiums, 
while returning a net savings to Medicare.
improved Access to information from the 
Common working file
CMS could provide virtual-attribution ACOs with 
information from the Common Working File, enabling 
them to see the entire spectrum of Medicare utiliza-
tion for their attributed beneficiaries. The Common 
Working File contains the records of all claims pro-
cessed for all Medicare beneficiaries, as well as exten-
sive demographic and eligibility data. As noted above, 
one disadvantage of the virtual-attribution model is 
the lack of information coming to the ACO about care 
delivered to attributed beneficiaries in other settings. 
If a patient attributed to Geisinger Health System opts 
to receive cancer care at New York’s Memorial Sloan-
Kettering Cancer Center, for example, Geisinger might 
or might not be aware of this, and as such, might have 
little chance of “repatriating” the patient or influenc-
ing the quality and cost of that care. This situation 
could be remedied, at least in part, if CMS were to 
provide timely and accurate information to ACOs 
about such external services (although it is possible 
that such sharing of personal health information across 
unrelated providers would require patient permission). 
Alternatively, ACOs could be granted direct access to 
the CMS data file itself and use such access to develop 
internal reports for both clinical and business uses.
exemption from Payment update Processes
Congress could grant a waiver to allow hospitals and 
physicians that are part of ACOs to be exempt from 
the hospital payment update process and Sustainable 
Growth Rate (SGR) physician payment update process, 
respectively. Neither practicing physicians nor the 
hospital industry is happy with the current formulas 
that Congress uses to produce annual payment updates. 
Hospitals believe that their costs are underappreciated, 
while physicians chafe under the annual payment cuts 
produced by the SGR formula.10 At the same time, 
the work necessary to form an ACO that is capable of 
receiving and succeeding with prospective forms of 
payment is not easy. In many parts of the country, the 
formation of new ACOs will require the breakdown 
of isolation and distrust among community physicians 
and between physicians and hospitals.
Congress could gradually increase the rela-
tive attractiveness of undertaking ACO formation by 
exempting ACOs from the current, unpopular pay-
ment update formulas and establishing separate update 
formulas for them that reflect performance in quality 
improvement and the mitigation of unnecessary costs. 
Over time, the level of payment received by such orga-
nizations would reflect their performance on quality, 
outcomes, and efficiency.
Reduction of unnecessary geographic 
variation in Spending
The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services could 
set payment benchmarks for accountable care organiza-
tions in a way that recognizes and reduces utilization-
based geographic variations in Medicare expenditures. 
Among the difficulties inherent in establishing pay-
ment rates for ACOs—both existing and new ones—
are the disparities across the United States in both 
utilization-driven Medicare costs and input-cost-based 
Medicare payment rates. In the extreme, very efficient, 
high-quality ACOs in rural parts of the country could 
be disadvantaged, and inefficient ACOs in high-cost 
areas unfairly advantaged, unless Congress directs the 
design of ACO payment to take into account legitimate 
baseline performance differences. Problems emerge 
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more likely, by the evolution of a coordinated payer 
environment.
government Support for Accountable Care 
Organization Development
Congress could authorize and fund HHS to support the 
development and success of ACOs. In the early 1990s, 
the seemingly inevitable growth of managed care and 
concomitant prospective payment methodologies led 
to the rapid creation, in many parts of the country, of 
physician hospital organizations and other integrated 
delivery systems. Later, as managed care retreated in 
the face of public opprobrium, many of these organiza-
tions disintegrated because they were poorly conceived 
and more poorly executed. In many cases, neither the 
hospital executives nor the physician staff leaders had 
the requisite knowledge or experience to make these 
entities successful. Sadly, this period of change was too 
short to really test whether or not these models could 
have been made to work properly. 
Many believe that to be successful, ACOs, like 
the physician hospital organizations preceding them, 
must find models of structural, financial, clinical, and 
cultural integration between hospitals and physicians. 
Much of the potential savings in U.S. health care 
spending may come from the prevention of unneces-
sary hospital admissions and the efficient delivery of 
services during necessary admissions. Such savings 
will require alignment of incentives among, and com-
mon actions by, hospital administrators and physicians. 
There are many examples of successful integrated 
delivery systems, but no commonly accepted model 
about how to create one de novo.
Congress could charge the new Office of 
Payment and Delivery System Improvement with 
the specific task of designing constructive support 
processes for the creation of new integrated delivery 
systems. The Health Maintenance Organization Act 
of 1973 is an example of just such a government-
sponsored initiative. The office could ask for coopera-
tion from existing successful organizations to create 
a “business incubator” as part of overall health care 
reform efforts. It is likely that a number of existing 
whether payment benchmarks are based on national 
or local cost and quality trends; a solution may be to 
blend the two approaches.
“Rebuttable Presumptions” of Regulatory 
Compliance
To enable hospitals and physicians to work together 
as ACOs and share savings with each other and with 
Medicare, Congress could allow limited “rebuttable 
presumptions” of adherence to specific Federal Trade 
Commission regulations, civil monetary penalty regu-
lations, and self-referral/anti-kickback rules. A variety 
of federal regulations, most well intended, have the 
aggregate effect of inhibiting the development and 
testing of innovations related to the financial and 
clinical integration of hospitals and physician groups. 
In general, regulators have been reluctant to provide 
“safe harbors” for organizations seeking to test such 
innovations, out of concern that these will abet abusive 
practices. Regulators have instead preferred to provide 
retrospective judgments on a case-by-case basis. This 
pattern has created a fear of prosecution (whether or 
not such fear is warranted) and has dampened enthusi-
asm for innovation.
To be fair, there are examples of anticompetitive 
behavior in health care delivery, including that exhib-
ited by some newly created entities, such as single- 
specialty medical groups. These examples have rein-
forced the reluctance of legislators and regulators 
to relax regulation broadly. However, some forbear-
ance may be possible through a moderate shifting of 
the burden of proof in regulatory enforcement by the 
rebuttable presumptions of regulatory compliance in 
certain situations, such as hospital/physician gainshar-
ing for quality improvement and cost-reduction efforts. 
(MedPAC has recommended that Congress allow lim-
ited gainsharing arrangements for this purpose.) 
Nevertheless, the development of accountable 
care organizations has raised a legitimate concern 
about the potential for abusive pricing behavior. There 
may already be some examples of this in parts of 
the country. This problem will have to be addressed 
either by a restructured regulatory environment or, 
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successful organizations would respond to such 
requests out of a desire to see overall health care 
reform succeed. There were examples of such coopera-
tion following the passage of the 1973 law.
full Conversion to Accountable Care 
Organizations by 2020
Congress and/or the President could set a direction and 
timetable for conversion to ACOs, albeit a somewhat 
distant one. For example, Congress could choose to 
pass a joint resolution indicating a strong preference 
for the Medicare program to favor beneficiaries receiv-
ing care from ACOs by a date certain, such as 2020, 
with exceptions allowed for sparsely populated areas 
or other special circumstances. Such a preference could 
take the form of payment update incentives for ACOs 
or beneficiary incentives to enroll with ACOs, among 
other possibilities. The government’s establishment of 
such a clear direction could spur physicians and hospi-
tals to undertake the hard work necessary to prepare for 
a new future.
COnCLuSiOn
U.S. health care would be better and more efficient 
if the system as a whole functioned the way top-
performing providers do, with greater accountability 
for specific populations and for the totality of care 
delivered. We do not believe there is a single organiza-
tional model for achieving such accountability. While 
this brief is informed by the perspective of the leaders 
of multispecialty medical groups, we do not presume 
that all providers should look like such groups (indeed, 
they do not even look like one another in many cases). 
Rather, we believe all providers need to be prepared to 
be accountable, in one form or another, for all aspects 
of their patients’ care, including quality, outcomes,  
and costs. 
The U.S. needs delivery system reform, and 
the Medicare program is a good place to start. If there 
is health reform, Medicare should adopt policies that 
are consistent with the objectives of such reform and 
should play a lead role in achieving those objectives. 
However, Medicare needs to do something regardless 
of whether there is broader health reform or what form 
it takes.
Medicare should try a new approach to provider 
payment soon. There is a real sense of urgency, given 
the Obama administration’s push for health reform 
this year, and it should be open to a variety of methods 
to encourage increased integration in local delivery 
systems. Moreover, if Medicare engages in such initia-
tives, other payers can be expected to follow suit. In 
fact, the program’s involvement in multipayer initia-
tives—either initiated by Medicare, or with Medicare 
joining in with other payers to develop payment system 
reforms—could make any such initiatives more effec-
tive and more beneficial overall. 
It is not inappropriate to think about some “radi-
cal” ideas to extract the U.S health care delivery sys-
tem from the current quagmire in which it finds itself. 
The large multispecialty medical groups are ready now 
to participate in such a new approach and would be 
eager to operate under a system that rewards higher 
quality, greater efficiency, and more accountability.
how can medicare lead delivery system reForm? 11
notes
1 E. S. Fisher, D. E. Wennberg, T. A. Stukel et al., 
“The Implications of Regional Variations in 
Medicare Spending. Part 1: The Content, Quality 
and Content of Care,” Annals of Internal Medicine, 
Feb. 18, 2003 138(4):273–87; and E. S. Fisher, D. 
E. Wennberg, T. A. Stukel et al., “The Implications 
of Regional Variations in Medicare Spending. 
Part 2: Health Outcomes and Satisfaction with 
Care,” Annals of Internal Medicine, Feb. 18, 2003 
138(4):288–98.
2 S. M. Shortell and L. P. Casalino, “Health Care 
Reform Requires Accountable Care Systems,” 
Journal of the American Medical Association, July 
2, 2008 300(1):95–97.
3 Under some voluntary scenarios, patients who did 
not choose to participate might still be “attributed” 
to an accountable care organization for purposes of 
payment, but this attribution would be largely invis-
ible to the patient.
4 E. S. Fisher, D. O. Staiger, J. P. W. Bynum et al., 
“Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The 
Extended Hospital Medical Staff,” Health Affairs 
Web Exclusive, Dec. 5, 2006, w44–w57.
5 Obviously, this would not be a concern for Medicare, 
which sets its own prices for hospitals, but it would 
be a concern if private payers were involved.
6 It should be noted, however, that there is a sound 
actuarial reason for imposition of the 2 percent 
threshold: without any threshold, in a “reward only” 
payment incentive system, year-to-year random 
variation in performance results would generate 
higher-than-appropriate payments.
7 D. R. Rittenhouse, S. M. Shortell, and E. S. Fisher, 
“Primary Care and Accountable Care—Two 
Essential Elements of Delivery-System Reform,” 
New England Journal of Medicine, published online 
Oct. 28, 2009.
8 The Medicare Payment Advisory Commission 
(MedPAC) has repeatedly noted the need for 
expanding CMS resources, to be applied to solving 
a variety of problems.
9 Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, Report to 
the Congress: Improving Incentives in the Medicare 
Program (Washington, D.C.: MedPAC, June 2009).
10 The SGR formula may be repealed or “rebased” 
as part of health care reform, but it is unlikely that 
Congress will ignore the impact of volume-of-
service increases in establishing a future physician 
payment update formula.
authors’ note
This paper is informed by a roundtable discussion, “How Can Medicare Lead Delivery System Reform?” spon-
sored by The Council of Accountable Physician Practices, The Commonwealth Fund, and the Kaiser Permanente 
Institute for Health Policy, held in Washington, D.C., on June 5, 2009. The report does not represent a consensus of 
the discussion participants but rather the observations and interpretations of the authors only. In addition, the opin-
ions expressed do not necessarily represent the views of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission (MedPAC), 
with which Dr. Crosson is affiliated, nor of the organizations by which any of the other authors is employed.
12 The CommonwealTh Fund
abouT The auThors
Francis J. Crosson, M.D., is a senior fellow with the Kaiser Permanente Institute for Health Policy and associ-
ate executive director of The Permanente Medical Group. Dr. Crosson has had a 30-plus-year career with Kaiser 
Permanente, including 10 years as executive director of the Permanente Federation, the physician side of that 
organization. He founded and continues to chair the Council of Accountable Physician Practices. He also serves 
as vice chairman of the Medicare Payment Advisory Commission, the federal panel that advises the U.S. Congress 
on Medicare issues. Dr. Crosson received his medical degree from Georgetown University.
Stuart Guterman, M.A., is an assistant vice president at The Commonwealth Fund, where he directs the program 
on Payment System Reform. Previously, he was director of the Office of Research, Development, and Information 
at the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services; senior analyst at the Congressional Budget Office; principal 
research associate in the Health Policy Center at the Urban Institute; deputy director of the Medicare Payment 
Advisory Commission (and its predecessor, the Prospective Payment Assessment Commission); and chief of 
institutional studies in the Health Care Financing Administration’s Office of Research. 
Nancy Taylor, M.B.A., is executive director of the Council of Accountable Physician Practices (CAPP), a con-
sortium of 33 of the nation’s most prominent physician-led multispecialty group practices. CAPP is dedicated 
to improving health care delivery through research, innovation, and policy reform. She is also senior director of 
external relations and communications for The Permanente Federation (the umbrella organization for the eight 
associated medical groups of Kaiser Permanente), for which she oversees policy, marketing, and communications 
activities. Previously, Ms. Taylor led her own health care consulting practice and held leadership and consult-
ing positions with The Permanente Medical Group, Hamilton/KSA, and Mercer, Inc. Ms. Taylor has a master’s 
degree in business administration from the Yale School of Management.
How Can MediCare Lead deLivery SySteM reforM? 13
Rashell Young, M.B.A., M.P.H., is a consultant with the Council of Accountable Physician Practices. She has 
worked with clients on numerous finance and strategic issues both within and outside the health care industry. 
She works frequently with start-up biotech, medical device, and pharmaceutical companies in evaluating and 
quantifying future income opportunities. She also has worked in health care delivery, focusing on implement-
able operational strategies in trauma injury prevention and continuity of care. Ms. Young has worked with Kaiser 
Permanente, Blue Shield of California, Finance Scholars Group, Cogent Valuation, the Huron Consulting Group, 
and BDO Seidman, the national accounting firm. She has been published on accounting, finance, and integrated 
health care delivery topics and has been qualified as an expert witness. She has master’s degrees in business 
administration and public health from the University of California, Berkeley.
Laura Tollen, M.P.H., is a senior policy consultant with the Kaiser Permanente Institute for Health Policy. Her 
work focuses on the potential of organized health care delivery systems to contain costs and improve the quality 
and safety of care. Prior to joining Kaiser Permanente, she was project director at the Institute for Health Policy 
Solutions, an independent policy think tank. She is the author of numerous journal articles and served as coeditor, 
with Alain Enthoven, of Toward a 21st Century Health System: The Contributions and Promise of Prepaid Group 
Practice. Ms. Tollen holds a master of public health degree from the University of California, Berkeley.
Editorial support was provided by Christopher Hollander.

